Many network applic ationsdep end on the security of the domain name system (DNS). A ttackson DNS can cause denial of service and entity authentication to fail. In our appr oach,we use formal speci c ationsto characterize DNS clients and DNS name servers, and to de ne a security goal: A name server should only use DNS data that is consistent with data from name servers that manage the corresp onding domains (i.e., authoritative name servers). T o enfor cethe security goal, we formally specify a DNS wrapper that examines the inc oming and the outgoing DNS messages of a name server to dete ct messages that could cause violations of the security goal, coop erates with the c orresponding authoritative name servers to diagnose those messages, and drops the messages that are identi ed as thr eats. Based on the wrapper sp eci c ation, we implemented a wrapper prototyp eand evaluated its performance. Our experiments show that thewr apper incurs r easonableoverhead and is e e ctive againstDNS attacks such as cache poisoning and certain spoo ng attacks.
Introduction
This paper presents a detection-response approach for protecting the domain name system (DNS). DNS manages a distributed database to support a wide variety of netw orkapplications suc h as electronic mail, WWW, and remote login. F or example, net w ork applications rely on DNS to translate betw een host names and IP addresses. A compromise to DNS may cause denial of service (when a client cannot locate the netw ork address of a server) and entity authentication to fail (when host names are used to specify trust relationships among hosts). F or example, if DNS is compromised to cause a client to use incorrect DNS data, the client m a y be unable to obtain the IP address of a mail server and thus cannot communicate with it. As another example, if the DNS mapping for www.cnn.com is compromised, an attacker may be able to direct a web browser looking for the news web site to one that gives out counterfeit news. If the web browser does not authenticate the server, the user may use the counterfeit news as if they were genuine. Some applications (e.g., Unix rlogin) use name-based authentication. Attacking DNS could change the name-to-address mapping, and hence may allow an attacker's machine to masquerade as a trusted machine. Thus protecting DNS is security critical.
Our approach for protecting DNS is driven b y formal speci cations. The use of formal speci cations enables reasoning, thus pro viding assurance for our solution. F ormal methods have not been used in connection with an intrusion detection approach. Using Vienna Development Method (VDM), w e dev eloped formal specications to characterize DNS clien ts and DNS servers, and to de ne a security g o a l a s a n invarian t:A DNS server should only use DNS data that are consistent with those disseminated by the corresponding authoritativ e sources. We designed a DNS wrapper, also characterized by formal speci cations, that enforces the securit y goal. Our DNS wrapper examines DNS messages en tering and departing a protected name server to detect those messages that could lead to violations of our securit y goal. If the wrapper does not have enough information to determine whether a DNS message represents an attack, it collaborates with the name servers that manage the relevant part of the DNS name space. If the DNS wrapper cannot verify the data of the DNS message to be trustworthy, the wrapper logs the message and prevents it from reaching the protected name serv er.
Section 2 reviews the basics of the domain name system. (Readers are referred to 1, 13, 1 4 ] for more details about DNS.) Section 3 describes some known DNS vulnerabilities. Section 4 presents our system model. Section 5 presents a DNS wrapper that enforces our security goal for DNS. Based on the wrapper speci cation, w eimplemented a wrapper protot ype. Section 6 describes our experiments for evaluating the performance of the wrapper implementation and their results. The results show that the DNS wrapper incurs reasonable overheads and is e ective against some known DNS attacks. Section 7 concludes, compares our work with related work, and suggests future w ork. F or the sak e of brevit y,w eomit the formal speci cations for DNS clients, DNS servers, and the DNS wrapper in this paper. See 7] for details of this work.
Overview of DNS

What is DNS?
DNS manages a distributed database indexed by names. The database has a hierarchical structure. A name (e.g., cs.ucdavis.edu.) has a structure that reects the hierarchical name space, which is depicted in Figure 1 . A zone is a contiguous part of the domain name space that is managed together by a set of machines, called name servers. The name of a zone is the concatenation of the node labels on the path from the topmost node of the zone to the root of the domain name space. The name servers that manage a zone are said to be authoritative for this zone. Every subtree of the domain name space is called a domain. The name of a domain is the same as the zone name of the topmost node of the corresponding subtree.
One of the main design goals for DNS is to have distributed administration. The distribution is achieved by delegation. F or instance, insteadof storing all the information about the en tire edu domain, which is a very large domain, in a single name server, the responsibility of managing the ucdavis.edu domain is delegated to the authoritative name servers of UC Davis. The authoritative name serv ers of the edu zone are equipped with the names of the authoritative name serv ers of theucdavis.edu zone. Thus if the edu servers need information about the ucdavis.edu domain, they kno w whic h servers to contact.
Clients of DNS are called resolvers, which are usually implemented as a set of library routines. Whenever an application on a machine needs to use the name service, it invokes the resolv er onits local machine, and the resolver in teracts with name servers to obtain the information needed. The most common implementations of resolvers are called stub resolvers (e.g., BIND 1 resolv ersare stub resolv ers). Stub resolvers only do the minimal job of assembling queries, sending them to servers, and re-sending them if the queries are not answered. Most of the w orkis carried out by name servers.
How does DNS Work?
The process of retrieving data from DNS is called name resolution or simply resolution. Suppose the host h1.cs.ucdavis.edu needs the IP address of h2.cs.foo.edu. The resolv er will query a local name server in the cs.ucdavis.edu domain. There are tw omodes of resolution in DNS: iterative and recursive. In the iterative mode, when a name server receiv es a query for whic h it does notkno w the answer, the server will refer the querier to other servers that are more likely to know t h e answer. Each server is initialized with the addresses of some authoritative s e r v ers of the root zone. Moreover, the root servers know the authoritative serv ers of the second-level domains (e.g., edu domain). Second-level servers know the authoritative serv ers of third-level domains, and so on. Thus by following the tree structure, the querier can get \closer" to the answer after each r eferral. Figure 2 shows the iterative resolution scenario. For example, when a r o o t server receiv es aniterative query for the domain name h2.cs.foo.edu, i t r e f e r s t h e querier to the edu serv ers. Eventually , the querier will locate the authoritative s e r v ers of cs.foo.edu and obtain the IP address. In the recursive mode, a server either answers the query or nds out the answer by c o n tacting other servers itself and then returns the answer to The above resolution process may be quite expensive in terms of resolution time and the numberofmessages sent. T o speed up the process, servers store the results of the previous queries in their caches. Consider the above example. If h1.cs.ucdavis.edu asks its local server to resolve the same name twice, the serv er can reply immediately based on the information stored in its cache the second time. Also, if in a subsequent query h1.cs.ucdavis.edu asks its local server to nd out the IP address of h3.cs.foo.edu, the local server can skip a few steps and con tacta cs.foo.edu serv er directly . If the querier gets an answer from an authoritative server, the answer is called an authoritative answer. Otherwise, it is called a non-authoritative answer. Because there may b e c hanges tothe mapping, servers do not cac he data forever. Authoritative serv ers attach t i m eto-liv e 2 (TTL) tags to data. Upon expiration, a name server should remove the data from its cache.
DNS Message Format
A DNS message consists of a header and four sections: question, answer, authority, and additional. A resour c e r ecord (RR) is a unit of information in the last three sections. Here is a list of common resource record types 13]: 2 There is no single \best" TTL value for all resource records. The TTL value of a resource record is based on a tradeo betw een consistency and performance. A small TTL will increase the average name resolution time because remote name servers will remove t h e resource record earlier and need to query the corresponding name servers more often. If a resource record is changed, a small TTL enables other name servers to purge the stale data and to use the new data earlier. One should reduce the TTL before the resource record is changed. A common TTL value is one day (e.g., the cs.ucda vis.edu zone), although some high-lev el zones (e.g., the root zone) use a multi-day T T L .
An A record contains a 32-bit IP address for the speci ed domain name. A CNAME record lists the original (or canonical) name of the speci ed domain name. In other w ords, aCNAME resource record maps an alias to the canonical domain name. An HINFO record contains host information such as the operating system used. An MX record contains a host name acting as a mail exchange for the speci ed domain. An NS record contains a host name that is an authoritative name server for the speci ed domain. A PTR record contains a domain name corresponding to the speci ed IP address. An SOA record contains information for the entire speci ed domain such a s the domain administrator's mail address. The header has a query id eld, which is used to facilitate requesters' matching up responses to outstanding queries. The question section carries a target domain name (QNAME), a query type (QTYPE), and a query class (QCLASS). F or example, a query to nd the IP address of the host h2.cs.foo.edu has QNAME=h2.cs.foo.edu, QTYPE=A, and QCLASS=IN (which stands for the Internet). The answer section carries RRs that directly answer the query. The authority section carries RRs that describe other authoritative serv ers. F or instance, the authority section may contain NS RRs to refer the querier to other name servers during iterative resolution. The additional section carries RRs that may b e helpful in using the RRs in the other sections. F or instance, the additional section of a response may c o n tain A RRs to provide the IP addresses for the NS RRs listed in the authority section.
3. DNS Vulnerabilities Bellovin 3, 4] , Gavron 10] , Sc hubaand Spa ord 15], Vixie 17] , and CERT advisory CA-98.05 5] discuss sev eral securit y problems of DNS. In the following, w e describe t wo w ell-known problems of DNS that are relev an t to this paper| cache poisoning and failure to authenticate DNS responses.
In the cache poisoning attack, an attacker can trick a n a m e s e r v er S 1 to query another name server S 2 . If S 2 is a compromised name server, the attacker can have S 2 to return a DNS response that contains faked RRs.
Otherwise, the attacker can masquerade asS 2 and send the DNS response to S 1 (see below). Recall that a name server cac hes the results of previous in teractions with other servers to improve performance. When S 1 uses its contaminated cache to resolve a name, it may use the incorrect DNS data supplied by the attacker. The message authentication mechanism used by most implementations of DNS is weak: A DNS server (or a DNS clien t) attac hes an id to a query , and uses it to match with the id of the corresponding response.
Suppose a server S 1 sends a query to another server S 2 . If an attacker can predict the query id used by S 1 , t h e attacker can send a forged response that has a matching query id to S 1 . When S 1 receiv es the response that claims to be from S 2 , S 1 has no way t o v erify that the response actually comes from S 2 . If S 2 is unavailable when the query is sent, the attacker can just masquerade as S 2 and send the forged response to S 1 . If S 2 is operational, the attacker can mount a denial of service attack against S 2 to prev en tS 2 from responding to S 1 's query. Also, if a name server receiv es multiple responses for its query, it uses the rst response. Thus even if S 2 can reply to S 1 , the attacker can still succeed if the forged response reaches S 1 before S 2 's response does.
System Model
In our model, there are two t ypes of processes: DNS servers and DNS clients (or resolvers). These processes communicate with each other through message passing. Resolvers only communicate with serv ers serv ers can communicate with other servers in addition to communicating with resolv ers. These two t ypes of processes are denoted by Server and R esolverrespectively. Basically, w e model DNS clients and DNS servers as an object that maintains a view on DNS data. T h e v i e w m a y be changed only through communicating with other DNS components (i.e., sending DNS requests and receiving DNS responses) or by timeouts for DNS data.
We use the Vienna Development Method (VDM) to specify our system model, because VDM provides a formal language for specifying data and the associated operations, and includes a framework to perform renements of data and operations. Another reason is that VDM provides a basis for performing formal verication, which makes it more convenient to extend our w ork in the future.Most of the symbols used in VDM are standard mathematical symbols. We will describe the non-standard or less commonly used ones as w e need them. Readers are referred to 11, 2] for more details on VDM. In the following, Section 4.1 presents our DNS data model. Section 4.2 de nes our notion of a process' view on DNS data. Section 4.3 formalizes the DNS concept of authority. Section 4.4 discusses our assumptions about DNS. Section 4.5 presents our security goal for DNS. The header section includes a query id, an opcode 3 , a truncated message ag 4 , and a response code 5 . We denote these elds of m by id(m), opcode(m), tc(m), and rcode(m) respectively. The question section consists of a domain name, a query type, and a query class. The answer, the authority, and the additional sections consists of resource records (RR). We denote the set of resource records of a message m by RRof(m). A RR consists of a domain name, a type, a class, a 32-bit TTL (in seconds), and a resource data eld. For a resource record r, w edenote these elds by dname(r), type(r), class(r), ttl(r), and rdata(r) respectively. DNS manages a distributed database. The database is indexed by a tuple (dname, type, class) of type Idx. The range of the database is a set of resource records, abbreviated as RR. T odenote this database type in VDM, we use a map type DbMap : Idx m ; !RR;set.
DNS Data
DNS messages (of type
A map type T = D m ; !R has domain D and range R.
The domain and the range of T are denoted by dom(T ) and rng(T ) respectively. A map of type T is a set that relates single items in D to single items in R. RRType = fA PTR NS CNAME MX SOA = HINFO : : : g RRClass = fIN : : : g TTL = f0 : : : 2 32 ; 1g 3 The opcode of a DNS message distinguishes between different t ypes of queries|standard queries and inverse queries. A standard query looks for the resource data given a domain name. An inverse query looks for the domain name given resource data. 4 The truncated message ag indicates whether the DNS message is truncated. Message truncation occurs when the message length is greater than that allow ed on the transmission medium. 5 The response code eld is used to indicate errors and exceptions. 4 fcz j 9 rr2 rngZoneData(z) type(rr) = NSd name(rr) 6 = z^cz = dname(rr)g
View
Every process maintains its view of the database.
T h e v i e w o f a s e r v er s can be partitioned into the authorit ypart (denoted by V iew auth (s)) and the cache part (denoted by V iew cache (s)), where the former takes precedence over the latter. The map overwrite operator y takes tw o map operands and returns a map that contains all the elements in the second operand and those in the rst operand whose domain does not appear in the domain of the second operand. F or a server that is not authoritative for any part of the database and for a resolver, the corresponding V i e w auth is . Some servers are said to be authoritative for a zone their views on the zone data de ne them. AuthAnswer((dname(rr) t y p e (rr) class(rr))
Assumptions
In this section, we explicitly list our assumptions for DNS. They concern with ho wname servers prioritize RR sets, the accuracy of authoritative DNS data, the e ect of changes on DNS data, the accuracy of delegation data, and the power of attackers on eavesdropping DNS packets. Assumption 1 Protected servers do not add an RR to the V iew cache of a proce s s i f a n R R t h a t c orresponds to the same index already exists in the V iew cache . Moreover, protected servers prefer authoritative data over cache data. Both of them hold for \good" servers (i.e., servers that behave according to the DNS RFC 13 , 14 ] ). Some server implementations rank data from di erent sources at di erent credibility lev els. Moreover, data from a higher credibility l e v el can preempt data from a l o w er credibilit y l e v el. We do not model data credibility l e v els in our work for the sake of simplicity. Because our DNS wrapper only allows authoritative data to reac h a protected name server, this simpli cation does not a ect the validit y of our results. Assumption 2 Data from an authoritative server are correct.
F or example, if a server is authoritative for a machine h and the server sa ys the IP address of h is i, then we believ e that the IP address ofh is i.
Assumption 3 When a server attaches a TTL with t seconds to a resour cerecord for which the server is authoritative, the resour cerecord will be valid for the next t seconds.
We state this assumption because there is no revocation mechanism in DNS. Without this assumption, one cannot determine the validit yof DNS data as soon as they leave their authoritative serv ers. We argue that this assumption is reasonable. When a resource record needs to be c hanged, the TTL of this resource record is usually decreased before the changeover so that incorrect/stale records will timeout shortly after the changeover.
Assumption 4 For every zone, the dele gation data and the glue data of its child zones corresp ond to the NS RRs and the A RRs of the name servers of the child zones.
An example violation of this assumption is called lame dele gation. Lame delegation is caused by operational errors: A system administrator changes the name servers for a zone without changing the corresponding delegation information in the parent zone or notifying the system administrator of the parent zone about the change.
Assumption 5 A ttackers cannot eavesdr op on the DNS packets sent betwe enour protected servers and the le gitimate name servers. This is a limit w eplace on the attac kers if attac kers can monitor the communication, our scheme may fail to cope with spoo ng attacks. In the future, when the use of the DNS securit y extensions 8] (DNSSEC)| which employs digital signatures to authenticate DNS data|is widespread, we m a y drop this assumption. An implication of this assumption is that by randomizing the query id used, the probability that an attacker can forge a response whose id matches the randomized query id is small. Thus attempts for sending forged responses by guessing the query id used can be detected by the wrapper.
Our Goal
Our goal is to ensure that the view of a protected name server agrees with those of the corresponding authoritative name serv ers. This goal is speci ed using a VDM data invarian t. A data invariant of a data type speci es the predicates that must hold true during the execution of a system. Our name server speci cation, which re ects the minimal functionalities of DNS servers among existing implementations, does not satisfy this data invarian t because it allows nonauthoritative DNS data to be used by a name server.
Thus for a name server s, Authoritative(rng V iew(s)) may not hold. In the next section, w e will present our solution|a security wrapper for protecting name servers. Our DNS wrapper lters out DNS messages containing resource records that cannot be veri ed as authoritative. Therefore, a protected name server that satis es the data invarian t can be constructed b y c o mposing a name server and our DNS wrapper. 
Our DNS Wrapper
We u s e security wrapp er(or simply wrapper) to refer to a piece of softw are that encapsulates a component, such a s a name serv er, to improve its securit y. Using wrappers to enhance the security o f existing softw are is not a new idea. Related work includes TCP wrapper 16] and TIS' generic softw are wrappers 9]. How ev er, our work is di erent in that it addresses problems that are DNS speci c and it involves the use of formal speci cations.
Consider a wrapper w. W rapper w chec ks DNS response packets going to a name server and ensures that they are authenticated 6 and they agree with authoritative answers. If a resource record in the response does not come from an authoritative server, wrapper w locates an authoritative serv er and queries that server for the authoritative answer. To l o c a t e an authoritative server for a zone, say z, the wrapper starts with a serv er, say s, that is known to be an authoritative server for an ancestor zone of z, and queries server s for authoritative s e r v ers of the child zone that is either an ancestor zone of z or z itself. The searc h is performed by t r a versing the domain name tree, one zone at a time, until an authoritative serv er for the DNS data being veri ed is located. Recall that the zone data maintained by a server include the name server data of the delegated zones. Moreover, the zone data, including the zone cut data and the glue data, tak e precedence over RRs obtained from outside sources. Thus the delegation data is immune from cache poisoning attacks. Our scheme exploits this fact to securely locate the authoritative serv ers.
Let ns denote the name server protected by wrapper w. Our wrapper consists of tw o main parts:W rapper s q for processing queries, and Wrapper s r for processing responses. (The subscript s stands for \serv er".)
Wrapper w processes queries generated by ns before they are sent out, and processes queries destined for ns. Wrapper w also processes responses destined for ns those that are accepted by w will be forwarded to ns.
When ns sends a query, wrapper w generates a random query id and uses it to replace the original query id (used by ns). We use a translation table to track the mapping betw een the random query id's used by w and the original query id's used by ns.
Wrapper s q processes queries that involve ns. These queries can be partitioned into tw otypes. The rst type corresponds to the queries that are sent t o ns. The second type corresponds to the queries that are generated by ns. These tw o types of queries are treated di erently. For the rst type, wrapper w chec ksthe queries to determine whether they are w ell-formed (e.g., the answer, the authority, and the additional sections for a standard query should be empty). F or the second type, the wrapper generates a random query id, replaces the query id used in the original query by t h i s randomly generated query id, and updates the local query id translation authentication is hardened. Wrapper s r2 veri es the response messages to ensure that they agree with authoritative answers, and copes with cache poisoning attacks. There are two t ypes of responses received b y a wrapper: responses for queries generated by the protected name server ns, and responses for queries generated by the wrapper itself (for message diagnosis purposes). When a response for a query generated by ns is receiv ed, the wrapper uses thequery id translation table to restore the query id (to the one used by ns) before passing the response to Wrapper s r2.
Experiments
Overview
We conducted experiments to ev aluate the response time (i.e., the elapsed time betw eensending a query to a name server and receiving a response from it) of a wrapped name server, and to evaluate the false positive rate, the false negative rate, and the computational overhead (i.e., CPU time used) of our wrapper.
Based on the DNS wrapper speci cation, we implemented a prototype of the DNS wrapper for BIND release 4.9.5, which w as the latest release for BIND when w e started our implementation. The DNS wrapper was written in C. We modi ed the BIND name server source code to invok ethe DNS wrapper upon receiving queries and responses and upon sending queries to other name servers.
In this section, we describe tw o sets of experiments and their results. In Experiment A , w e examined the response time, the false positive rate, and the computational overhead of our wrapper using a trace of DNS queries received b y a name serv er in an operational setting. In Experiment B , w e examined the false negative rate of our wrapper with respect to four attacks: three cac he poisoning attacks and one spoo ng attack.
General Experimental Setup
In these experiments, our name servers (BIND 4.9.5) listened to port4000 instead of port 53 (the de facto standard port number for name serv ers) for DNS queries to preven t queries outside our experiments from a ecting our results.
In ev ery run of our experiments, we started a fresh copy of our name server because name servers maintain a c a c he for DNS information obtained through interacting with other name servers. The behavior of a name server can be quite di erent depending on whether the DNS information queried can be found in the cache. Restarting name servers can avoid interference betw een consecutive runs of the experiment.
We used a modi ed version of nslo okupas the DNS client in our experiments. (See 1] for a good tutorial on nslookup.) We chose nslookup because it is a convenient tool for generating DNS queries and displaying DNS responses. Moreover, nslookup can be easily con gured to use a speci ed name server port number and to query a speci ed name serv er. Our modi ed nslookup uses Unix gethrtime() system calls to record the time when a query is sent and when the corresponding response is received. Unless otherwise speci ed, we will use nslookup to refer to this modi ed version of nslookup.
Our experiments w ere performed on a lightly loaded Sun SPARC-5 running Solaris 2.5.1. We ran our name servers and nslo okupon the same machine to eliminate the net w orklatency for the communication betw een them, thus reducing the in uence of the local area netw ork load on the experimental results.
Because we did not have control over external name serv ers, and the inter-net w ork links bet w een our name server and external name servers, w e performed Experiment A m ultiple times and calculated the average response time.
Experiment A
Data Set
The data set for Experiment A consisted of a trace of 1340 DNS queries received b y a name serv er in a \real w orld"setting. T ogather the trace of DNS queries, w emodi ed a name server to log all DNS queries it receiv ed and ran it for t wo d a ys. We also modi ed the local BIND resolver con guration le to direct all DNS queries to this name server. In the resolver con guration le, the search list w as consisted ofcs.ucdavis.edu., ucdavis.edu., and ucop.edu. When a BIND resolver is invoked to resolve a relative domain name|a domain name that does not ha vea trailing dot|it appends the domain names in the order speci ed in the search list and attempt to resolv ethem until a positiv eresponse is receiv ed. If none of them results in a successful resolution, the resolver then generates a query for the relative domain name itself. F or example, when the BIND resolver is in voked for domain name dn, it attempts to resolve f o r dn.cs.ucdavis.edu., dn.ucdavis.edu., dn.ucop.edu., a n d dn in that order until a successful resolution is obtained.
Experimental Procedure
1. Start a wrapped name server. 2. Run nslo okupto query the wrapped name serv er for resolving the 1340 DNS queries sequentially . 3. Record the total system CPU time and the total user CPU time used. 4. T erminate the wrapped name server. 5. Repeat the above procedure using an unmodi ed name server instead of a wrapped name server.
Experimental Results
T able 1 shows the statistics related to response times recorded by nslo okupbased on 33 runs of this experiment. The mean response time for the wrapped server was 0.12 second per query, and that for the unmodied server w as 0.08 second per query . We examined the trace segments that correspond to \steep" increases in the response times (e.g., 400 th -600 th query), we found that they could be explained by DNS queries generated by w eb sur ng sessions, which involv edmostly remote and distinct domain names. Speci cally, the trace segment for the 400 th -600 th query included 43 remote and distinct domain names. The average total response times for those 43 queries for the unmodi ed server and the wrapped server w ere 28.29 seconds and 47.54 seconds respectively, which accounted for 83% and 88% of the total response times for that interval respectively. Table 2 shows the CPU times used b y the unmodi ed server and the wrapped server. The gures show that the average CPU times used are a small fraction (8% for the unmodi ed server and 7% for the wrapped serv er) of the total response time. Thus the response time overhead of the wrapper reported in Table 1 was largely due to w aiting for the response messages in the message diagnosis process. The average total CPU time increased from 9.33 seconds to 11.29 seconds (i.e., a 21% increase).
The number of false positives ranged from 2-10 per run, with the mean being 5.85 and the standard deviation being 1.89. Among the false positives, 80% of them were caused by name server behaviors thatviolate our name server speci cation or to a violation of our assumptions. For example, false positiv escaused by miscon gurations of name servers are in this category. The remaining 20% of the false positiv eswere generated when the wrapper gave up on diagnosing a DNS message after the amount of resources spen t (e.g., the number of DNS queries issued) had reached a threshold. The threshold is used to ensure that the amount of resources used for verifying a message is bounded, thus protecting the wrapper from problems like denial of service attacks.
Experiment B
The main goal of Experiment B is to examine the detection rate of malicious attacks of a wrapped name server (i.e., false negative rate). We investigated the follo wing four types of attacks:
Sending incorrect resour c e r ecords for a r emote domain name to the target: This is accomplished by using a CNAME resource record in the answer section of a response message to introduce (in the resource data eld) an arbitrary domain name for which the target serv er is not authoritative, and then including incorrect resource records for this remote domain name in the additional section of the response message. Sending inc orrect resour ce records that con ict with the zone data for which the targ e t i s a u t h o ritative: In particular, the attacker uses a CNAME resource record to link to an A resource record for which the target is authoritative. Sending resour c e r ecords that correspo n d t o a n o nexisting domain name that lives in the target server's zone. Sending a resp onse with a guesse d query id: In this attack, one queries the target server to trigger it to send a query to the attacker, whom records the query id used. A second query is then issued to trigger thetarget to query the attac ker again. Instead of using the query id of the second query, the attacker adds one to the query id used in the rst query and uses the result as the query id in its second response. The rst three types of attacks correspond to sending incorrect DNS data to a name server (i.e., cac he poisoning attacks). The fourth type of attacks corresponds to masquerading attacks. Our wrapper used randomized query id's for outgoing queries. Thus attackers who do not have access to those queries will have to guess the query id's used for their forged response messages. As a result, their forged messages will be detected with high probability.
Data Set
In Experiment B, w e modi ed the data set used in Experiment A b y inserting tw o queries that correspond to each of the four types of attacks at random locations in the t wo-day trace. Moreover, we also inserted four queries at random locations in the trace as controls. These queries correspond to di erent domain names in the domain for which a malicious name server is authoritative but do not trigger an attack.
Experimental Procedure
1. Start a malicious name server for a new subdomain dns.cs.ucdavis.edu. When that malicious name server is ask ed to resolve for certain domain names that reside in the dns.cs.ucdavis.edu. domain, depending on the domain names queried, it will either return incorrect DNS resource records or send out response messages with an incorrect query id or a predicted query id. 2. Start a wrapped name server. 3. Run nslo okup with the modi ed trace of DNS queries as input and send the queries sequentially to the wrapped name server. 4. T erminate the wrapped name server. 5. T erminate the malicious name server. 6. Repeat the above procedure using an unmodi ed name server instead of a wrapped name server.
Experimental Results
We ran the experiment v e times. In all ve runs, all eight attacks (i.e., tw o from each of the four attack types) were reported correctly by the wrapped name server, and none of the response messages corresponding to the control queries were misclassi ed as attacks. When we applied these four t ypes of attacks toan unmodi ed name server, the rst type of attacks succeeded in planting incorrect DNS data into the cache of the target server. F or the second and the third t ype, the unmodi ed name server did not cache the incorrect DNS data for domain names that belong to its authoritativ e domain. How ev er, the name serv er did forward the en tire response message receiv ed, including those incorrect resource records for which the name serv er was authoritative, to its clien t. That did not make muc h di erence for our experiments because the client used was nslo okup, which did not perform cac hing. How ever, if the clien t w asanother name serv er that was not authoritative for those incorrect DNS data, the cache of the clien t w ouldbe corrupted. This situation may occur when the clien t is a caching-only server 7 that uses another name server as a forwarder 8 . The fourth ty p e o f a t t a c ks succeeded for an unmodi ed name server. It was because the query id used by the unmodi ed name server w as predictable:the query id used in successive queries always di ered by o n e .
Conclusions and F utureWork
This paper presents a detection-response approach for protecting DNS. Our approach consists of the following steps. First, w ede ne a securit y goal|name serv ers only use DNS data that are consistent with the corresponding authoritative data. Second, we d eclare the threats, namely cache poisoning and spoofing attacks. Third, w edev elopa DNS model, which includes formal characterizations of DNS clien ts and 7 A cac hing-only serv er is a name serv er that is not authoritative for any domain. 8 A forwarder is a name server to whic h other name serv ers forw ard their recursiv e queries. A forw arder is useful for building a large cache for remote DNS data, especially when communication bet w een local mac hines and remote machines is slow o r restricted. DNS servers. F ourth,w e design a DNSwrapper with the objective that the composition of the speci cation for a protected name server and that for the wrapper satis es our security goal for DNS. If the DNS wrapper receives a DNS message that may cause violations of the securit y goal, the wrapper drops the message instead of forwarding it to the protected name server. Fifth, w e use the formal speci cation for the wrapper to guide our implementation of a wrapper prototype.
T o counter cache poisoning, Vixie 17 ] presents enhancements to BIND. Brie y, BIND version 4.9.3 chec ks the input resource records more carefully before cac hing them.Moreover, it implements a credibility level scheme in which resource records from a more credible source take precedence over those from a less credible one. Cheswick and Bellovin 6] present a design for a DNS proxy (dnsproxy). In their design, the domain name space is partitioned into regions called realms. A realm is served by a set of servers. Depending on the query name of a DNS request, dnsproxy forw ards the request to the servers responsible for the corresponding realm. Certain resource records in response messages|those that do not refer to realm to which the query name belongs, and those that satisfy a set of ltering rules|are removed to protect the queriers. Eastlake and Kaufman 8] present security extensions to DNS (DNSSEC) that uses digital signatures to supportdata authen tication for DNS data. In DNSSEC, new resource record types are introduced for public keys and digital signatures. Security-aw are servers and security-aw are resolvers can use zone keys, which are either statically con gured or learned by c haining through zones, to verify the origins of resource records. Compared to the prior w orkfor protecting DNS, our DNS wrapper has the following advantages:
Pro vides assurance b y employing formal speci cations (written in VDM) to characterize DNS components, to state the security goal, and to characterize our solution. E ective against cache poisoning attacks and certain spoo ng attacks (i.e., query id guessing) when the assumptions in Section 4.4 are met. . Among 4184 randomly picked com zones, 1344 of them (i.e., 32:1%) were found to be vulnerable to cache poisoning attacks. In other words, the name servers of those zones could be compromised and gave out incorrect information about other domains, including its delegated domains. We note that the e ectiveness of our DNS wrapper is not a ected by attac ks against external name servers as long as our assumptions are met.
There are several directions for future research.
T o further raise the assurance level of our wrapper, one may perform a complete formal veri cation from speci cation to implementation. The VDM speci cations dev eloped can be used as the basis for conducting the formal veri cation.
Results from Experiment A sho wa 0.437% false positive rate for the DNS wrapper. Because the majority of these false positiv esw erecaused by miscon gurations of external name servers, a nontrivial modi cation for the DNS wrapper may b e needed to signi cantly reduce the false positiv e rate.
We have not discussed protecting DNS resolv ers. If the communication path betw een a resolver and its trusted local name serv er is secure, and the name server is protected by the DNS wrapper, the DNS data received by the resolv eris \safe" because a wrapped name server only uses DNS data that are consistent with the corresponding authoritative answers. F uture researc h m a y be conducted to protect DNS resolvers when the resolver-server communication path is insecure. A possibility is to adapt the DNS wrapper to protect resolvers. One may apply our approach to protect other netw ork services and privileged processes.
